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Abstract 
 We examined the influence of external recommendations on recognition memory 
decisions. In contrast to prior literature that primarily focuses on the negative impacts of 
external influences during memory judgments, we investigated whether participants can 
capitalize on explicit reliable recommendations in order to improve their performance.  In the 
first experiment, participants were given explicit external recommendations (“Likely Old” or 
“Likely New”) that were 75% accurate for deeply and shallowly encoded test items. In the 
second experiment, participants were given varying levels of recommendations (65% and 
85% accurate). Across both experiments we found that participants improved their 
performance when given external recommendations relative to when no recommendations 
were available. Furthermore, we found that the degree to which participants benefitted from 
external recommendations is, in part, dependent on metacognitive monitoring ability. Finally, 
corrective feedback did not seem to improve participants’ ability to utilize external 
recommendations.  
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Introduction 
Recognition memory does not take place in a vacuum and it is often the case that 
environmental factors can signal the likely memory status of an encountered stimulus.  For 
example, when identifying a person in the hall one might use cues such as location (are you 
in a place where most people tend to be familiar?), time of day (are you likely to encounter 
this person at this time?), or a nearby friend’s explicit opinion about whether or not he/she 
recognizes the individual. Such an approach would be ideal because it would mean that the 
observer is not wasting potentially valuable information when making recognition judgments.  
That is, the observer would be utilizing two useful sources of information, namely, 
environmental cues and internal memory signals when judging memory status.  However, 
inappropriately incorporating this information —such as under relying or over relying on 
external cues— can result in awkward and costly mistakes (e.g. accidentally approaching a 
stranger because you ignored your friend’s advice that the person in the hall seems highly 
unfamiliar). Therefore, ideal observers should not only be sensitive to environmental factors, 
but also rely on them judiciously.  
One extant framework that suggests that observers should be able to judiciously 
integrate cues into recognition judgments is the Theory of Signal Detection (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). Indeed, this model was developed under the assumption that observers 
render decisions in a statistically ideal manner (Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003). In 
the case of recognition memory judgments it is assumed that observers estimate two 
likelihoods based on the memory strength of each test item, namely, the likelihood that an 
item of a particular strength level is from the studied pool and the likelihood that the item is 
from the novel pool. Unsurprisingly, the observer chooses the response with the highest 
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likelihood, and this decision strategy is captured by the ratio of the likelihoods or the odds 
the item is old. In other words, the point at which the two likelihoods are equal (i.e. 1:1odds) 
is an optimal neutral point, and items with odds above this likelihood criterion should be 
called old, while items below this criterion should be called new (Figure 1A). The likelihood 
ratio decision model is referred to as an ideal observer model because it maximizes the long-
term accuracy of the decision maker. Such a model is assumed in several different 
applications of Signal Detection Theory to recognition memory judgments (see Glanzer, 
Hilford, & Maloney, 2009). 	  
If one assumes observers have access to such sophisticated information, the 
integration of environmental influences, such as external recommendations, into memory 
judgments is very straightforward, provided the reliability of the source of recommendations 
is known (c.f., Jaeger, Lauris, Selmeczy, & Dobbins, 2011). For example, imagine an 
observer receives an external recommendation (Likely Old or Likely New) that is 75% 
predictive of the upcoming test items memory status. A Likely Old cue would indicate 3:1 
odds that the upcoming item will be old vs. new, while a Likely New cue would indicate a 
1:3 odds that the upcoming item would be old vs. new.  An ideal observer would integrate 
this external recommendation into their decision by simply multiplying these odds with those 
derived from their own internal memory evidence, namely, the likelihood ratio decision 
variable assumed under Signal Detection Theory. For example, if an observer receives the 
recommendation Likely Old and their internal memory evidence suggests that the odds the 
item is old are 2:1, the odds specified by the recommendation and those indicated by the 
memory evidence (3/1 * 2/1) yields a final or posterior odds that the item is old of 6 to 1.  
This strongly indicates the participant should respond old and should do so more confidently 
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than he or she would have if the external recommendation were absent.  As shown in Figure 
1B, when given the recommendation Likely Old the entire likelihood decision axis is shifted, 
and the optimal decision criterion (odds ratio of 1:1) is shifted to the left. Returning to the 
prior example, if the observer instead received the recommendation Likely New for the same 
trial, then the posterior odds would be 2 to 3 that the item was old (1/3 * 2/1), indicating that 
the participant should now respond new. In this situation even though the observers’ internal 
evidence indicates that the item is old, when evaluated in light of the external 
recommendation the ideal response would be that the item is in fact new (Figure 1C). 
By optimally moving the decision criterion under external cueing as described above, 
observers maximize their long-term accuracy and elevate their performance relative to 
situations where no external cues are available. For example, under the case in which there 
are 100 studied and 100 new items the unbiased observer with no external cues in Figure 1A 
(d’ = 1) would respond correctly on 140 trials.  If, however, the actual odds of encountering 
old items were 3 to 1, such as under a Likely Old cue, then maintaining the same criterion 
location would not be ideal because the observer is not capitalizing on the disproportionate 
likelihood of encountering an old item (i.e. 75 old items to 25 new items). Instead the 
criterion should be shifted to the point on the axis where the prior odds of an item being old 
were 1 in 3 (Figure 1). Similarly, if the actual odds of encountering an old item were now 
instead 1 to 3 (i.e. 25 old items to 75 new items), such us under a Likely New cue, the 
criterion should be shifted to the point on the axis where the prior odds of an item being old 
were 3 in 1 (Figure 1). The performance difference between leaving the criterion at the 
midpoint across cued trials and uncued trials versus shifting between the two ideal locations 
for the two cueing conditions would be 139 correct responses in the former and 156 correct 
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responses in the latter (See Footnote 1). Thus, under a Signal Detection Theory model that 
assumes a likelihood ratio decision axis, observers should easily be able to integrate external 
recommendations into recognition judgments in order to considerably improve long-term 
accuracy when in the presence of reliable recommenders.  From this perspective, the 
presence of external cues in the environment is always viewed as a benefit provided their 
base rate validity is above chance.  However, in contrast to this positive outlook on the 
benefits of external influences during memory judgments, most prior work has instead 
focused on the negative impacts that such sources can have. 
Based on the pioneering social conformity work of Asch (1955), memory researchers 
have considered the potential negative impact of external recommendations during memory 
attributions. In a typical memory conformity experiment, participants are led to believe that 
they studied an identical set of stimuli as another participant or confederate, when in fact a 
subset of studied material was different. There are many variations as to how participants are 
later tested on these items (in groups vs. pairs, intentionally planned confederate vs. another 
participant as a confederate, virtual confederate vs. real confederate, etc.), but the general 
finding is that participants will conform to the response of the confederate (Allan & Gabbert, 
2008; Axmacher, Gossen, Elger, & Fell, 2010; Betz & Skowronski, 1996; Meade & Roediger, 
2002; Reysen, 2005; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; 
Walther et al., 2002; Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000; 
Wright, Gabbert, Memon, & London, 2008). Some of these memory conformity studies 
assess how memory on a final test is altered by false information introduced by a confederate 
during an earlier test (e.g. Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001; Betz & 
Skowronski, 1996), while other experiments specifically examine how participants’ 
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responding is influenced by trial-by-trial information suggested immediately before a 
recognition judgment (e.g. Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Reysen, 2005 group recognition test;  
Wright et al., 2000 Experiment 1). This prior research demonstrates that observers are 
sensitive to external influences, but much of this research uses deceptive others and focuses 
on its negative impacts. In these situations the observer may be best served by completely 
ignoring external influences.  
 In contrast to traditional memory conformity research, here we examine the degree to 
which observers can benefit from external cues from a source known to be reliable.  As noted 
earlier, the Signal Detection model illustrated in Figure 1 anticipates that observers should be 
able to easily incorporate such information.  However, many have questioned the degree of 
statistical sophistication assumed under the model and there are several findings that suggest 
actual performance can fall short of ideal.  For example, observers do not appear to adopt 
ideal criteria when provided monetary payout matrices (Green & Swets, 1989; Healy & 
Kubovy, 1978; MacMillan and Creelman, 2005) and response rates do not change for tests 
that are composed purely of one item type (i.e. only targets or only novel items) relative to 
standard recognition tests composed of both old and new items (Cox & Dobbins, 2011). One 
possibility for such shortcomings in memory paradigms is that observers either lack, or 
considerably differ in the degree to which they are subjectively aware of small gradations in 
their internal memory strength representations, a skill that would fall under the more general 
rubric of metacognitive awareness. More specifically, the extent to which participants’ 
changes in subjective confidence track changes in memory veracity has been referred to as 
metacognitive monitoring (Nelson, 1990). For example, observers differ in their ability to 
assess how well they have learned particular target material (judgments of learning) or their 
	   6	  
ability to predict future recognition of a general knowledge answer they could not currently 
recall (feeling of knowing)(Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2009)— however, this monitoring ability 
may transfer poorly between domains (see Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000). Given that 
accurate subjective awareness of memory representations may be potentially important for 
ideal criteria placement and hence effective cue utilization, we also examine a measure of 
metacognitive monitoring to see if it accounts for any differences in the ability of observers 
to benefit from external recommendations.  That is, we examine whether the utilization of 
external recommendations, at least in part, depends on metacognitive monitoring skills. Prior 
memory conformity research has begun to investigate metamnemonic awareness, but this 
research tends to focus on heuristics about when it is more or less appropriate to rely on an 
external source and does not examine individual differences in monitoring. These studies 
show that conformity increases when the confederate is highly confident (Schneider & 
Watkins, 1996; Wright et al., 2000), when items have lower memorability (Betz & 
Skowronski, 1996), when perceived encoding time is manipulated (Gabbert, Memon, & 
Wright, 2007), and when previously unseen items are non-salient (Walther et al., 2002).  
 Finally, were also interested in the possibility that the ability to use recognition 
recommendations might benefit from performance feedback. Prior work has suggested that 
trial-by-trial feedback may be necessary for accurate representations of statistical likelihoods 
(Turner, Van Zandt, & Brown, 2011), and a host of studies have demonstrated that feedback 
results in more appropriate criterion placement (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Kantner & Lindsay, 
2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Verde & Rotello, 2007). Based on this prior research, we 
hypothesized that feedback might result in more appropriate criterion shifts in response to the 
external recommendations and hence a greater improvement in performance when comparing 
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uncued to cued recognition accuracy.  
To summarize, our aims are to determine: a) whether observers can effectively 
incorporate predictive external recommendations into their recognition decisions, b) the role 
of metacognitive awareness in this skill, and c) whether feedback improves this ability. In our 
first experiment we manipulated levels of processing during encoding in order to assess 
subsequent cueing effects under varying levels of memory evidence, while in our second 
experiment we manipulated the levels of cue validity in order to determine if our results 
replicate under these conditions.   
Experiment 1 
Participants 
 Experiment 1 included 37 Washington University students (average age = 20.9, 23 
females) who were paid $20 for participation. Three subjects were removed due to low 
performance (d’<0.19) leaving 34 subjects for analyses. All participants provided informed 
consent in accordance with the University’s Institutional Review Board.  
Materials and Procedure 
Testing was self-paced with observers entering their responses via keyboard, and 
presentation and timing controlled via Matlab’s Psychophysics Toolbox (version 3.0.8) 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For each participant, words were randomly selected from a 
1216 item pool with an average of 7.09 letters, 2.34 syllables and Kučera -Francis frequency 
of 8.85.  
Participants completed four study/test cycles, with two tests preceded by deep 
encoding and two shallow encoding.  The order of deep and shallow tests sequentially 
alternated with half the participants beginning with the shallow test condition and half the 
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deep test condition (100 study items and 200 test items for each cycle).  During shallow 
encoding participants indicated whether the first and last letter of each presented word was in 
alphabetical order, whereas during deep encoding they performed an abstract/concrete rating. 
Recognition testing immediately followed each study phase, with subjects indicating whether 
randomly intermixed old and new items were studied (“old”) or novel (“new”) (100 old items, 
100 new items). On 120 of the test trials (60 old, 60 new) a probabilistic mnemonic cue, 
“Likely Old” or “Likely New”, was presented one second before the probe word appeared. 
These cues were correct 75% of the time, with subjects correctly informed that “Cues will be 
correct 75% of the time. This means about 7 out of 10 times the cue will give you the correct 
answer and should be useful for your recognition judgment.” In addition to the cued trials, 
there were 80 (40 old, 40 new) baseline uncued trials intermixed in the test phase, with 
participants notified that some portion of the probes would be presented without anticipatory 
cues. After each old/new recognition decision, participants provided confidence on a 6-point 
scale ranging from 50% (guessing) to 100% (certain), which was then immediately followed 
by corrective feedback for half the participants.   
Results and Discussion 
The order in which the two levels of processing conditions were administered did not 
influence accuracy (d’) or criteria (C), nor did it interact with other factors.  Given this, we 
collapsed across test order in the analyses below. Hit rates of 1 and false alarm rates of 0 
were corrected using the formulas suggested by MacMillan and Creelman (2005) (1-1/(2N) 
for hits and 1/2N for false alarms, where N is the number of trials). 
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Does accuracy improve with provision of cues? 
To assess potential gains in accuracy (d’), we used a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures factors of Levels of Processing (deep vs. shallow targets present during 
test) and Cue Condition (cued vs. baseline), and a between subjects factor of Feedback 
(present or absent). Results revealed a main effect of Levels of Processing (F(1,32)=174.32, 
MSe = 0.26, p <0.001) reflecting higher accuracy for deep than shallow test items. There was 
also a main effect of Cue Condition (F(1,32)=36.65, MSe=0.06, p<0.001), indicating that 
participants significantly improved performance on cued vs. uncued/baseline trials (Table 1). 
In contrast, the interaction between Feedback and Cue Condition was not significant 
(F(1,32)=1.09, MSe=0.06, p=0.30), indicating that feedback did not have an appreciable 
effect on accuracy.  There were no significant two-way interactions and the three-way 
interaction also failed to reach significance. 
Overall these analyses demonstrate that participants increased their accuracy on cued 
trials relative to baseline trials for both deeply and shallowly encoded items, and this 
improvement in performance was not dependent upon the provision of feedback.  Thus, 
although they are effectively incorporating the cues into their judgments, the mechanism by 
which this occurs does not appear to require or benefit from feedback based learning.  We 
further consider the inefficacy of feedback in the discussion.  
 
Reactivity to Cues   
Because the accuracy analysis demonstrates that observers are improving when cues 
are in the environment, it is clearly the case that these cues are being used to adjust decision 
standards (Table 2).  Nonetheless, we wanted to verify that observers were shifting criteria 
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more vigorously during shallow tests than during deep tests, because this pattern should 
result if the cues are being considered in light of the recognition evidence.  That is, the cues 
should have more influence when the internal evidence is less discriminable (shallow tests) 
then when it is more discriminable (deep tests). Using C as our criteria measure, we ran a 2 X 
2 X 2 mixed ANOVA with repeated measures of Levels of Processing (deep vs. shallow) and 
Cue Type (Likely Old vs. Likely New), and a between subjects measure of Feedback (present 
or absent). Critically, we found a significant interaction between Levels of Processing and 
Cue Type (F(1,32)=21.34, MSe = 0.06, p <0.001), demonstrating that the difference in 
criteria across Likely Old and Likely New cue conditions was greater for shallow tests than 
deep tests. Additionally, the three way interaction between Levels of Processing, Cue Type, 
and Feedback was not significant (F(1,32)=0.094, MSe = 0.06, p = 0.76), suggesting that 
feedback did not influence the difference in criterion shifts for shallow and deep tests. 
Although comparing criteria under different levels of accuracy can be problematic, we are 
only interpreting the interaction in terms of the absolute difference in criteria between the 
two-cueing conditions for deep and shallow test items. In other words, we are only 
interpreting the absolute shift and not making direct comparisons about relative criteria 
placement across different accuracies. Thus, these results suggest that participants’ absolute 
shifts in criteria are greater under conditions where memory performance is lower which 
confirms that the cues are being used in relation to the quality of internal recognition 
evidence. Furthermore, these absolute shifts in criteria are not feedback dependent, again 
demonstrating the fact that the use of cues does not seem to benefit from feedback based 
learning. 
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Although judgments for deep test items are less influenced by cues than shallow test 
items, one might argue that participants’ responses just default to the cue, especially on 
shallow test items. If this was the case and participants were to always agree with the 
available cue, then we would expect a correct response rate of zero for invalidly cued items 
(i.e. cue Likely New for a target or Likely Old for a lure). In other words, if participants were 
always following the cue, they would always follow an incorrect cue and fail to respond 
accurately on any trial where the cue was incorrect. However, this was not the case. During 
both shallow and deep tests, the 95% confidence intervals for invalidly cued trial types 
clearly excluded zero (See Table 3). 
  
Individual differences in efficacy of cue use 
Although on average accuracy benefited from cueing, there were large individual 
differences in the degree of improvement. As noted in the introduction, the effective use of 
external cues may critically depend upon metacognitive awareness. To examine the role of 
metacognition we used the gamma index, which captures the correspondence between 
changes in subjective confidence and changes in accuracy at the trial-by-trial level for each 
participant (Nelson, 1984). Because gamma has a restricted range, unlike the accuracy 
measure d’, we used the logit transformation of gamma (G*) to improve its scale properties 
(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008).  
If metacognitive monitoring plays a role in cue utilization skill and is not a simple 
alternative measure of baseline observer accuracy, then hierarchical regression analysis 
should demonstrate that it makes a significant contribution to cued performance while 
baseline performance has been appropriately partialled from the data. In other words, we 
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examined if metacognitive monitoring explains any unique variance in cued performance that 
is non-overlapping with baseline recognition skill. Using a hierarchical regression analysis, 
we examined the contribution of metacognition to cued accuracy (d’) by entering feedback 
condition (dummy coded) and baseline (uncued) recognition accuracy as predictors in Step 1.  
Next, we examined whether metacognitive monitoring made a contribution beyond these 
factors by entering each participant’s G* as an additional predictor in Step 2.  Critically, G* 
was calculated from baseline performance and is therefore a measure of metacognitive 
monitoring in the complete absence of cues. Table 4 shows the results of the two hierarchical 
regressions that were separately conducted for the shallow and deep test lists. For the shallow 
test, in Step 1 baseline accuracy was a significant predictor (b=0.60, t(30)=5.02, p<0.001) of 
cued accuracy, while feedback group was not (b=-0.04, t(30)=-0.47, p=0.64). It is not 
surprising that subjects with high accuracy in the uncued condition would also have high 
accuracy under cueing.  However, the clear absence of any contribution of the feedback 
variable serves to again underscore the fact that the provision of feedback has no appreciable 
influence on the manner in which participants use the cues (see ANOVA results above).  
Entering G* in Step 2 explained an additional 7.37% variance (F(1,30)=4.72, p=0.04). When 
the hierarchical regression was repeated for the deep test list condition, a similar pattern 
emerged where in Step 1 baseline accuracy was a significant predictor of cued accuracy 
(b=0.77, t(29)=8.40, p<0.001) and feedback group was not (b=-0.16, t(29)=-1.28, p=0.21) , 
and during Step 2 G* accounted for an additional 5.08% of unique variance in cued 
performance (F(1,29)=6.00, p=0.02). 
The regression analyses demonstrate that cued performance is linked with baseline 
accuracy but more importantly, that after controlling for baseline performance, metacognitive 
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monitoring is a significant predictor of cued performance gains.  Again, the provision of 
feedback had little influence on the effective use of the external cues.  These results hold for 
both shallowly and deeply encoding items. In summary, Experiment 1 demonstrates that 
participants are able to benefit from external cues for both deep and shallow test items, 
individual differences in cued utilization performance are, in part, related to metacognitive 
monitoring ability, and feedback does not improve cue utilization performance.  
 
Experiment 2  
 For Experiment 2, we wanted to replicate our results from Experiment 1 and examine 
if participants are able to effectively differentiate between cues of differing validity (65% and 
85% predictive).  We again also examined whether cued performance is, in part, dependent 
on metacognitive monitoring ability.   
Participants 
Experiment 2 included 38 Washington University students (average age = 21.5, 18 
females) who were paid $20 for participation. Three subjects were removed due to chance 
performance (d’<0.19) leaving 35 subjects for analyses. All participants provided informed 
consent in accordance with the University’s Institutional Review Board 
Materials and Procedure:  
Testing was self-paced with observers entering their responses via keyboard, and 
presentation and timing controlled via Matlab’s Psychophysics Toolbox (version 3.0.8) 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For each participant, words were randomly selected from a 
1216 item pool with an average of 7.09 letters, 2.34 syllables and Kučera -Francis frequency 
of 8.85.  
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Participants completed four study/test cycles (100 study items each) during which the 
encoding task was syllable-counting (1,2,3 or more syllables?). During the recognition test a 
total of 160 (80 old, 80 new) words were preceded by a probabilistic mnemonic cue (Likely 
Old or Likely New) one second before the word probe appeared. Cue predictability varied for 
this experiment where half the cues were 65% predictive (40 old, 40 new) and half the cues 
were 85% predictive (40 old, 40 new). Subjects were clearly informed of the two different 
cue validities. The 65% predictive cues were presented in a smaller blue font with the 
numbers 65 appearing next to the cue. The 85% predictive cues were presented in a larger 
yellow font with the numbers 85 appearing next to the cue. Instructions stated, “Cues that are 
65% correct will give you the correct answer about 6 out of 10 times. Cues that are 85% 
correct will give you the correct answer about 8 out of 10 times. Use the cues to help increase 
your performance.” In addition to the cued trials, there were 40 (20 old, 20 new) baseline 
uncued trials intermixed in the test phase, with participants notified that some portion of the 
probes would be presented without anticipatory cues. Following each recognition decision 
subjects performed a confidence rating on a 6-point scale ranging from 50% (guessing) to 
100% (certain), which was then followed by corrective feedback for half the participants.   
Results and Discussion 
Does accuracy improve with provision of cues? 
 To asses gains in accuracy (d’), we used a 3 X 2 mixed ANOVA with a repeated 
measures factor of Cue Condition (uncued baseline, 65% predictive cue, 85% predictive cue) 
and a between subjects factor of Feedback (present or absent). Results revealed a significant 
main effect of Cue Condition (F(2,66)=44.13, MSe = 0.05, p <0.001), no significant effect of 
feedback (F(1,33)=1.18, MSe=0.45, p=0.28), and no significant interaction between Cue 
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Condition and Feedback (F(2,68)=0.54, MSe=0.05, p=0.58). Follow up post hoc tests on the 
main effect of Cue Condition demonstrated that relative to baseline, there was a significant 
increase in performance on 85% predictive cued trials (MSe=0.04, p<0.001) and only a 
numeric improvement on 65% predictive cued trials (MSe=0.05, p=0.17) (Table 1).  Overall, 
these results demonstrate that participants can benefit from the use of cues, even when two 
differing levels of cue predictability are intermixed. It is not necessarily surprising that 
performance does not significantly improve with the 65% predictive cues, since these cues 
are not highly accurate. However, replicating the results from Experiment 1, we find that 
when cues are highly predictive participants are able to improve their performance. 
Furthermore, we again see that cueing benefit does not depend on the provision of corrective 
feedback.  
 
Reactivity to Cues   
 We wanted to examine if observers were shifting criteria more vigorously during 
highly predictive cues (85%), since this pattern should result if participants consider the 
relative predictability of the two cue levels. That is, since the 85% cues are accurate more 
often we would expect participants responding to be more highly influenced by these more 
accurate cues. With criteria measure C as our dependent variable we ran a 2 X 2 X 2 mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures of Cue Type (Likely Old vs. Likely New) and Cue 
Condition (65% predictive cue, 85% predictive cue), and a between subjects factor of 
Feedback (absent or present). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between Cue 
Type and Cue Condition (F(1,33)=29.67, MSe=0.02, p<0.001), showing a greater difference 
in criterion shifts for 85% predictive cues than 65% predictive cues (Table 2). As before, the 
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3-way interaction between Cue Type, Cue Condition, and Feedback was not significant 
(F(1,33)=0.007, MSe=0.02, p=0.94). These results suggest that participants are in fact more 
influenced by high predictability cues than low predictability cues, and this relationship is not 
affected by feedback. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, it is clear that participants do not just 
default to the cue since the 95% confidence intervals for invalidly cued trial types all 
excluded zero (Table 3).  
 
Individual differences in efficacy of cue use 
 Although participants as a whole increased their cued performance relative to uncued 
baseline performance, there were once again large individual differences in cueing benefit. 
We wanted to replicate results from Experiment 1 and demonstrate that metacognitive 
monitoring contributes unique variance to cued performance above and beyond baseline 
performance. To examine this, we ran a separate hierarchical regression analysis on 65% 
predictive cued performance and 85% predictive cued performance with baseline uncued 
recognition accuracy (d’) and feedback as predictors in Step 1, and metacognitive monitoring 
(G*) as a predictor in Step 2 (Table 6). Because the two different cue predictabilities were 
intermixed with baseline uncued trials, both analyses use the same measure for baseline 
recognition as well as metacognitive monitoring (which is again determined from baseline 
confidence reports). In Step 1 for 65% predictive cued performance, baseline accuracy was a 
significant predictor (b=1.04, t(32)=9.70, p<0.001) while feedback was not (b=-0.10, t(32)=-
1.16, p=0.25). After controlling for baseline performance and feedback, metacognitive 
monitoring explained an additional 7.70% of the variance in cued performance (b=0.78, 
t(31)=3.74, p<0.001).  Similar results were also found when using 85% predictive cued 
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performance, where again in Step 1 baseline performance was a significant predictor (b=0.59, 
t(32)=4.50, p<0.001) and feedback was not (b=-0.18, t(32)=-1.73, p=0.09) , while in Step 2 
metacognitive monitoring explained an additional 7.74% of the variance in cued performance 
(b=0.64, t(31)=2.22, p=0.03). These results demonstrate that although uncued baseline 
recognition skill is related to cued performance, there is additional unique variance explained 
by metacognitive monitoring ability. These results hold for both 65% and 85% predictive 
cues, and do not seem to be affected by feedback.  Thus, replicating results from Experiment 
1, we find that metacognitive monitoring is a significant predictor in cued performance above 
and beyond baseline accuracy, and corrective feedback does not seem to influence this 
relationship.   
 
General Discussion  
Our study examines the integration of external recommendations and internal 
memory evidence when provided with a reliable source of information. Prior studies 
examining external influences on memory generally have a confederate intentionally provide 
misinformation on a subset of trials, while the participant is led to believe that he/she studied 
the same material as the confederate. The overall finding from this memory conformity 
research is that people’s decisions are in fact influenced by others’ responses (Allan & 
Gabbert, 2008; Axmacher et al., 2010; Betz & Skowronski, 1996; Meade & Roediger, 2002; 
Reysen, 2005; Roediger et al., 2001; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Walther et al., 2002; 
Wright et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2008). These prior studies focus on the 
negative aspect of conformity, mainly that participants’ performance is decreased when given 
inaccurate external information. Such implications from memory conformity research are 
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especially important when the goal is to minimize external influences, such as eyewitness 
testimony situations where the legal system wishes to preserve the original fidelity of the 
observer’s remembrances. However, most our recognition decisions are not made in the 
context of the legal system or in the context of deceptive others. Generally, our goal is to 
maximize accuracy and, in the presence of useful sources of external information, this goal is 
achieved by judiciously integrating external influences with internal memory evidence.  
Our study examined whether observers are able to increase performance when given 
predictive external recommendations and whether this skill is influenced by feedback and 
related to individual differences in metacognitive awareness. Under both shallow and deep 
encoding conditions (Experiment 1) and varying levels of cue validity (Experiment 2), 
participants elevated their performance on cued trials relative to baseline uncued trials, 
demonstrating that observers can judiciously incorporate known reliable external 
recommendations. When examining individual differences in cued performance, we found 
that after controlling for baseline recognition skill and feedback, metacognitive monitoring 
was a significant predictor of cued accuracy. Critically, this metamnemonic process is, in part, 
independent of memory retrieval or baseline recognition performance. Prior studies have 
assessed whether metamnemonic beliefs influence the degree of conformity (Betz & 
Skowronski, 1996; Gabbert et al., 2007; Schneider & Watkins, 1996; Walther et al., 2002; 
Wright et al., 2000), but these studies generally did not assess individual differences in 
metacognitive awareness or its contribution when observers are attempting to capitalize on 
external sources of information. Our study suggests that individual differences in monitoring 
may be relevant to assess in future memory conformity research as well as other studies 
assessing criterion shifts. Additionally, it would be interesting to determine if the ability to 
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incorporate cues, and the role of metacognitive monitoring in this process, changes across 
development. For example, given prior aging research suggesting behavioral inhibition 
deficits in healthy older adults (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), it may be the case that older adults 
may tend to over rely on external recommendations as opposed to judiciously incorporating 
them with internal memory evidence. Furthermore, we can examine whether this skill is 
domain general by assessing if external recommendations have similar effects on both 
recognition and perceptual decisions.     
The individual differences we found in the ability for observers to capitalize on 
external recommendations also has implications for Signal Detection models that assume a 
likelihood ratio decision axis. To the extent that observers actually have a decision axis akin 
to likelihood ratios, there are clearly considerable differences in the quality of it across 
observers. Additionally, the lack of any effect of feedback in the ability to utilize 
recommendations seems to suggest that corrective feedback does not result in updating of 
these representations.   
 We were surprised that corrective feedback did not improve the extent to which 
participants benefitted from external cueing, nor did it influence the degree to which 
metacognitive monitoring predicted cued performance. These results may seem puzzling 
since feedback could potentially inform participants about their subjective performance 
accuracy and help them respond ideally. Prior work on feedback in recognition memory 
suggests it does not improve recognition accuracy (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010), but that it is 
sometimes critical for observers to realize that a shift of the criterion may be appropriate or 
useful (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Verde & Rotello, 2007). The key 
difference between prior work using feedback and the current study, is that the in the former 
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feedback is typically used to alert the subject to some experimental manipulation that should 
ideally induce a criterion shift. For example, in Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) base rates of items 
were correlated with screen location such that words presented on one side were more likely 
to be targets and should result in more liberal responding relative to words presented on the 
other side of the screen. In Verde and Rotello (2007), the strength of old items was 
manipulated through repetition, where old items on the first half of the test were strong 
(repeated 4 times at study) and should elicit conservative responding, while items on the 
second half of the test were weak (repeated only once at study) and should elicit more liberal 
responding. The key commonality across these studies is that the feedback appeared critical 
in order for the subjects to realize that responding similarly to the two locations (Rhodes & 
Jacoby, 2007) or similarly in the two test halves (Verde & Rotello, 2007) was not ideal 
because the overall distributions of targets or the average target strength differed across 
locations or test periods. In the current study however, the question was not whether 
observers would realize that the external cues were potentially useful, since this information 
was already provided. Instead, the key question was whether the feedback would increase the 
ability of the observers to optimally integrate the cues into their judgments. In this context, 
feedback could inform participants whether the degree of criteria shifts under cueing are 
appropriate to result in improved performance. Unfortunately, this was not the case. 
Furthermore, one may also suspect that feedback could increase cueing benefits by 
improving metacognitive monitoring ability. However, our current experiments suggest this 
is not the case since feedback actually numerically lowered monitoring scores (data not 
shown), perhaps suggesting limits on the plasticity of metacognitive monitoring of 
recognition content.   
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Conclusion 
 In summary, our current study demonstrates that people are able to improve their 
recognition performance when using a known, reliable source of external information. 
Furthermore, the ability to improve from external information is, in part, dependent upon 
metacognitive monitoring ability.  Finally, the ability to benefit from external cues in 
recognition memory does not appear to be dependent on corrective feedback.  
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Footnote 
1.) Since there is greater information available under conditions where both cues and internal 
evidence are available, compared to conditions in which only internal evidence is available, 
the ideal observer must necessarily improve performance under the former.  Under the 
likelihood ratio Signal Detection model, this is achieved by advantageous shifting of the 
criterion on a trial-by-trial basis. When no external evidence is available, the hit rate and 
false alarm rate are weighted equally since the probability of occurrence for each item type is 
equal. During cued trials, we must weight response rates by the disproportionate likelihood 
of encountering an Old item. On trials where a 75% predictive cue reads Likely Old, Old 
items are presented 3 times more often than new items and we must weight the hit rate by 
75% and the false alarm rate by 25%. Although an ideal observer would respond Old more 
often in this condition (Figure 1B), the increase in hit rate is weighted much more heavily 
than the increase in false alarm rate. When the cue reads Likely New the hit rate must be 
weighted by 25% and the false alarm rate should be weighted by 75%, since new items are 
presented 3 times more often than old items. Again, although an ideal observer responds New 
more often under this condition (Figure 1C), the increase in correct rejections is weighted 
much more heavily than the increase in misses. To determine the overall hit and false alarm 
rate under cueing, we would sum the weighted hit rates under the Likely Old and Likely New 
cue and do the same for the false alarms rates. Thus, ideally we observe overall increases in 
accuracy when cues are available, but note that discrimination ability itself is not changing. 
For example, during a vision test (e.g. discriminating between X’s and Y’s) you may have a 
friend with perfect vision telling you all the correct answers. The aid of your friend results in 
you increasing your performance, but your perceptual acuity does not change. Analogously, 
predictive external cues in recognition memory can improve overall performance, but 
discrimination ability itself remains the same. 
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Figure 1 
 
The figure above depicts how optimal criteria location (odds of 1:1) shifts as a function of external 
recommendations under a likelihood ratio model of recognition memory. The x-axis represents likelihood ratios, 
and is computed by determining the probability density of the target distribution relative to the probability 
density of the lure distribution for a specific location. Notice that the response to the value indicated by an X 
(2:1 odds with No Cue), changes depending on the cueing condition. A.) Under conditions with no external cue, 
the ideal criteria location is in the center of the overlap of the two distributions B.) Under conditions with a 
Likely Old cue, the ideal observer would multiply the likelihood axis by cue predictability (3:1). Evidence 
values and ideal criteria shift to the left. C.) Under condition with a Likely New Cue, the ideal observer would 
multiply likelihood axis by cue predictability (1:3). Evidence values and ideal criteria shift to the right. 
 
 
 
1:3 1:2 1:1 2:1 3:1 
1:1 1.5:1 3:1 6:1 9:1 
1:9 1:6 1:3 1:1.5 1:1 
A)  No Cue 
B) Likely Old Cue 
C) Likely New Cue 
X 
Likely Old Likely New No Cue 
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Baseline Cued 
Exp 1 Shallow 0.91 (0.38) 1.17 (0.36) 
Deep 2.09 (0.66) 2.32 (0.62) 
Exp 2 65%  
Predictive 
 
1.20 (0.40) 
1.30 (0.48) 
85%  
Predictive 
1.65 (0.39) 
Table 1 Experiment 1 and 2 accuracy (d) under uncued baseline and cued 
conditions (standard deviations in parenthesis).  
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Likely Old Cue Likely New Cue 
Exp 1 Shallow -0.37 (0.40) 0.51 (0.34) 
Deep -0.47 (0.38) 0.007 (0.35) 
Exp 2 65%  
Predictive 
-0.27 (0.34) 0.27 (0.26) 
85%  
Predictive 
-0.42 (0.43) 0.41 (0.30) 
Table 2 Experiment 1 and 2 criteria (C) under Likely Old and Likely New 
cues (standard deviations in parenthesis).  
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Invalid HR Invalid CR 
Exp 1 Shallow 0.47 (0.41-0.53) 0.52 (0.45-0.58) 
Deep 0.83 (0.79-0.87) 0.70 (0.65-0.75) 
Exp 2 65%  
Predictive 
0.63 (0.58-0.68) 0.60 (0.55-0.66) 
85% Predictive 0.56 (0.50-0.62) 0.55 (0.49-0.62) 
Table 3 Experiment 1 and 2 hit and correct rejections rates under invalid 
cues (95% confidence intervals in parenthesis).  
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Table 4 Experiment 1 hierarchical regression analysis with cued accuracy 
(d) as the dependent variable for shallow and deep encoding.   
Shallow Encoding 
Variable B Std Error 
of B  
P 
Step 1 Uncued Recognition (d) 0.60 0.12 <0.001 
Feedback -0.04 0.09 0.64 0.47 
Step 2 Metacognitive monitoring 
(logit gamma) 
0.95 0.43 0.04 0.55 0.07 
Deep Encoding 
 
Variable B Std Error 
of B  
P 
Step 1 Uncued Recognition (d) 0.77 0.09 <0.001 
Feedback -0.16 0.12 0.21 0.71 
 
Step 2 Metacognitive monitoring 
(logit gamma) 
0.69 0.28 0.02 0.76 0.05 
R2 ΔR2
R2 ΔR2
	   28	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Experiment 2 hierarchical regression analysis with cued accuracy 
(d) as the dependent variable for 65% predictive cues and 85% predictive 
cues  .   
65% Predictive Cues 
Variable B Std Error 
of B  
P 
Step 1 Uncued Recognition (d) 1.04 0.12 <0.001 
Feedback -0.10 0.08 0.25 0.75 
Step 2 Metacognitive monitoring 
(logit gamma) 
0.79 0.21 <0.001 0.82 0.07 
85% Predictive Cues 
Variable B Std Error 
of B  
P 
Step 1 Uncued Recognition (d) 0.59 0.13 <0.001 
Feedback -0.18 0.10 0.09 0.43 
Step 2 Metacognitive monitoring 
(logit gamma) 
0.64 0.29 0.03 0.51 0.08 
R2 ΔR2
R2 ΔR2
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